--U.S. conventional forces demobilized even while foreign commitments accepted (Truman Doctrine).
--Cold War begins and Truman %dministration adopts containment policy; following Stalin's Berlin Blockade, U.S. incorporates atomic bombs into war plans (asymmetrical strategy).
--Soviets break U.S. atomic monopoly.
1950-59:
Grappling with Nuclear ~rms --Korean War and NSC-68 establish limited conventional war as policy option~ (symmetrical response).
--N~TO conventional force goals not met; NSC-162/2 provides impetus both for U.S. forward deployment of forces and tactical nuclear capabilities.
--Eisenhower ~dministration adopts "Massive Retaliation" strategy and expands heavy bomber force (asymmetrical response); both U.S. and Soviets develop hydrogen bomb.
--By 1956 U.S. accepts "Finite Deterrence" in lieu of continued strategic buildup; tactical nuclear capabilities emphasized (~rmy, however, prefers increased conventional forces for limited war scenar los) .
--Khrushchev's Berlin saber rattling and Soviet ICEM development increase Cold War tension.
--Gaither Report points to vulnerability of U.S. strategic (bomber) forces to soviet preemptive attack; survivable retaliatory forces emphasized.
By end of decade Golden ~ge of U.S. nuclear theorists begins; _ssues debated include:
--Counter force vs countervalue deterrence --Deploying secure 2nd strike retaliatory forces --Credibility of extended deterrence --Escalation dominance (intra-war deterrence thresholds) --Utility of tactical nuclear weapons C.
1960-69:
From Crisis to Deterrence --Kenned~ %dministzation adopts counter force and flexible response strategiess and deploys substantial numbers of ICHMs and SLBMs (s~mmetrical responses) .
--Cuban Missile Crisis: Khrushchev's surreptitious attempt to regain nuclear blackmail leverage rebuffed by overwhelming U.S. strategic nuclear and local naval superiority (successful nuclear crisis management involving reciprocal commitments to dismantle IRBMs located outside of national territory).
--U.S. moves~ from counter force to "Mutual ~ssured Destruction" retaliatory strategy (M%D rejects escalation dominance criterion).
--By end of decade soviets greatly increasing nuclear forces, ~specially heavy ICBMs optimized for counter force preemption.
". 1970-79:
Seeking Parity through Negotiations and Technology --~BM Treat~ and S~LT I~ demonstrate strategic offense-defense linkage; negotiations over strategic arms confirm perception that nuclear arms are qualitatively different than conventional arms.
--U.S. deploy MIRVs to offset Soviet throwweight and SNDV numerical advantages; by end of decade soviets also FIRVing (increasing U.S. concern over ICBM vulnerability.
--October 1973: Nixon ~dministzation orders nuclear alert to deter Soviets from intervening in Middle East wa~ (asymmetrical ..... response/extended deterrence).
--S~LT II negotiations delink: offensive from defensive strategic forces, establish equal aggregate limits on missles and bombers but not throw-weight or warheads.
--"Countervailing Strateg}": U.S. (Schlesinger and E~own sought to bolster U.S. retaliation capability and prevent Soviet escalation dominance by increasing targeting fe~xibility beyond M~D).
E.
1980-89: Strengthening U.S. Strategic Nuclear Leverage through Programs and Negotiations
INF Crisis:
During era of strategic parity, Soviet attempt to .in leverage over Western Europe at expense of U.S. extended deterrence credibility fails; SS-20 problem negotiated away after U.S. deploys own theater nuclear forces in Europe.
--U.S. begins deployment of updated triad (ICHM, SLPM, heavy bombers + ~LCMs)of strategic forces; public resistance especially strong to new FX ICBF and mobile basing proposals.
FFP --SDI:
U.S. negotiating leverage enhanced through advanced technology ~ and D program; strategic offense-defense linkage reestablished, at least in theory (asymmetrical response).
--START:
principle of "50% reductions" and equality in both warheads and delivery vehicles agreed by U.S. and soviets (although questions raised about whether remaining forces will be more or less vulnerable than at present).
--Hoth Reagan and Gorbachev agree at summit that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." --Soviets proclaim "No First Use"doctrine, declare defensive strategy (see Defense Minister Yazov's speeech at NDU (10/3/89), and admit violation of ~BM Treaty. Deterrence is thus a political act. Clausewitz also provides the odern reader with a profound cautionary note which must apply to the use of nuclear deterrence--be very careful and precise about the purpose to be served, the risks of miscalculation are great (Prodie and Schelling would agree).
D. "The aim of war should be...to defeat the enemy .... Particular factors can often be decisive.., one must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind.
Out of these characteristics a center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.
That is the point against which all our energies should be directed."
This long quote on Clausewitz's identification of the center of g~avity as the decisive point for defeat of the enemy is exceptionally important when pondering the utility of strategic nuclear forces for deterrence.
Heated debate in the U.S. has for too long focused on abstract concern about the stabilizing or stabilizing consequences of deploying strategic nuclear forces either optimized for counterforce or countervalue missions, debate quite divorced from determining what type of force can best deter the Soviets. Clausewitz provides the framework (locating the Soviets' center of gravity) for answering the question. Result: To be effective, U.S. strategic nuclear forces in addition to being optimized to survive a first strike must also be optimized to ~etaliate against Soviet military forces (the Soviet center of gravity). Thus, the U.S. must design accuracy into SLBMs, heavy bombers/~LCMs, and surviviability plus accuracy into its ICBMs.
E. "If two or more states combine against another the result is still poltically speaking a single war.
But this political unity is a matter of degree...I would, therefore, s~tate it as a principle that if you can vanquish all your enemies by defeating one of them, that defeat must be the main objective of the war." F. "Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.
The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of f~iction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war."
Clausewitz provides a cautionary note to modern strategists who work with abstract mathematical models:
Real world crises are lot antiseptic, Murphy's Law applies. Fine-tuning escalation dominance theories (Kahn) or developing a complex "Countervailing Strategy" (Brown) do not sound strategic deterrence planning make.
Strategic nuclear forces have deterrence utility to the extent that they are perceived by one's enemy of being able to execute a viable war plan. In short, develop effective forces and'%imple"retaliatory strategy~ocused on destruction of a substantial portion of the Soviet armed forces and supporting infrastructure. Using strategic nuclea~ forces to attempt to convey subtle intrawar escalation dominance messages is not a workable option.
G. "~s a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity-composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blin4 natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone." Clausewitz's "remakable trinity" constitutes a social compact between government, the armed services and people.
The government established the political purpose, the military provides the means for achieving the political end, and the people provide the will.
~Ii three are equall~ indispensable for strategic nuclear deterrence to work. Too often modern theorists neglect the third component--the people. The long sorry history of inability to obtain political consensus to mobile basing options for the MX amply justifies the continuing relevance of Clausewitz's observation.
IV. Conclusion:
This paper has been difficult to write but I p~wa, pwppw~ deliberately chose Clausewitz in order to search for enduring principles which can aid our understanding of nuclear deterrence and he utility of strategic nuclear forces.
-9-Having become more comfortable over the years with reading contemporary nuclear strategists' frequently abstract quantitative tracts, Clausewitz was welcome relief. Whether or not he speaks to us f~om the ages or only was a vehicle for expressing my own hard-headed biases about strategic nuclear issues is for the reader to judge.
I close with a quote from Kissinger written after his period of public service:
"To expect the Soviet leaders to restrain themselves from exploiting circumstances they conceive to be favorable is to misread history. To foreclose Soviet opportunities is thus the essence of the West's responsibility.
It is up to us to define the limits of~Soviet aims." 
